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Introduction
There tends to be little that the United States and Europe agree upon these
days.' Even their cooperation in the war on terrorism has been tinged with
jealousy, hurt feelings, and resentment over America's growing political,
f Professor of Law, Drake University Law School; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1979;
A.B., Harvard College, 1976.
1. See, e.g., Editorial, Cross Talk Among Allies, WASH. POST, Feb. 20, 2002, at A14:
Blunt and unpleasant rhetoric has been flying back and forth between the
United States and Europe in the past few weeks, at remarkably senior levels of
government. President Bush has been publicly chastised by the British, French
and German foreign ministers for his description of Iran, Iraq and North Korea
as an "axis of evil"; he has been demeaned as pandering to domestic opinion,
informed that he was too simplistic and warned against treating European allies
as American "satellites." Mr. Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell have
replied in kind, dismissing the Euro-criticisms as the "vapors" of hyperventilat-
ing politicians. Coming as it does amid questions about Europe's slackening
military commitment to NATO and America's drift toward unilateralism, the
argument has an alarming tone.
See also Steven Erlanger, Europe Seethes as the U.S. Flies Solo in World Affairs, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 23, 2002, at A8. For a discussion of the "axis of evil," see infra note 17 and accom-
panying text.
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economic, cultural, and military power.2 In Afghanistan, for example,
America's successful use of its high-tech arsenal proved the envy of the
Europeans, showing how much the military imbalance between the United
States and Europe has grown, 3 and the extent to which America has
advanced technologically beyond the European nations.4 Meanwhile, the
war's strategic realities have caused American policy makers to question
the primacy of the European alliance; 5 the role played by Russia seemed
much more crucial to achieving America's strategic objectives than did
Western Europe.6 The Bush administration's unilateralist inclinations
7
may be the most visible indication that "America's furrow in world affairs
has long been diverging from the European Union's."8
Trade has certainly been an arena of discord between America and
Europe. At the World Trade Organization (WTO), the two sides are at log-
gerheads over a growing list of issues including hormone treated beef
restrictions, subsidies to Airbus, farm subsidies, data processing, steel
imports, and the so-called Byrd amendment. 9 On the horizon loom some
$4 billion in trade sanctions that the European Union (EU) has threatened
to impose on American products unless the United States changes its tax
laws. The Europeans want the United States to conform its Internal Reve-
nue Code (IRC) to a WTO ruling on foreign sales corporations (FSCs).10
According to the WTO, tax breaks that FSCs receive under the IRC violate
global trading rules. 1 ' So far, the two sides have been unable to reach a
negotiated settlement in the matter despite U.S. trade negotiator Robert
2. See, e.g., Charles Moore, Editorial, Our Friends in Europe, WALL ST. J., Mar. 8,
2002, at A1O.
3. See, e.g., David Ignatius, Editorial, The Transatlantic Rift is Getting Serious, WASH.
POST, Feb. 15, 2002, at A33 (quoting NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson's concern
that Europe risks becoming a "military pygmy"); see also Erlanger, supra note 1 (report-
ing that EU Commissioner for Foreign Policy, Christopher Patten, acknowledges that,
for the Europeans, part of the problem with America is that "America's military weight
dwarfs that of the rest of the world, and it is growing heavier .
4. See Ignatius, supra note 3.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See Cross Talk Among Allies, supra note 1; see also Michael Naumann, Editorial,
Why Europe Is Wary of War in Iraq, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 18, 2002, at A15 (asserting that from
the European perspective, "Washington's unilateralism ... looks like simply a form of
America's longstanding isolationism, which is to say that the distance is created by
America, not by Europe."); Erlanger, supra note 1.
8. See Mr. Bush Goes to Europe, THE ECONOMIST, June 9, 2001, at 9.
9. See Hunter R. Clark, Amy Bogran & Hayley Hanson, The WTO Ruling on Foreign
Sales Corporations: Costliest Battle Yet in an Escalating Trade War Between the United States
and the European Union?, 10 MINN.J. GLOBAL TRADE 291, 316 (2001). For a discussion of
the European-American steel dispute, see Mike Allen & Steven Pearlstein, Bush Settles on
Tariff for Steel Imports, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 2002, at Al, A6-7; Paul Blustein, EU Chal-
lenges U.S. Steel Tariffs at WTO, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 2002, at E3. For an explanation of
the controversy involving the Byrd amendment, see More Nations Protest U.S. Trade Law,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2001.
10. See generally Clark et al., supra note 9 (discussing the WTO ruling on FSCs); see
also, David L. Aaron, Editorial, Heading Off a Trade War, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 2001, at
A29.
11. See Clark et al., supra note 9, at 292.
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Zoellick's dire warning that $4 billion in anti-American trade sanctions
would go off like a "nuclear bomb" in the world trade system.'
t 2
My own writing has characterized the United States and Europe as
engaged in an "escalating trade war. '' t 3 Washington Post columnist David
Ignatius has gone farther, likening the overall state of relations between the
United States and Europe to "a marriage that has gotten out of sync-with
one partner feeling left behind as the other becomes more successful."'
1 4
The Economist agrees, citing numerous ways in which the two partners sim-
ply do not understand each other anymore:
The United States is a very different place from Europe, and the differences
will grow. Demographically, Americans are increasingly Asian and Latino,
less inclined when looking "home" to turn to Europe. Their affection for
guns, religion, the death penalty and genetically modified crops seems
strange to Europeans. Just as baffling to Americans is Europeans' toleration
of high taxes, fussy regulation and indulgent state help for idlers and unfor-
tunates. While Americans remain individualistic citizens of a nation-state at
the height of its power, Europeans are absorbed in an unprecedented enter-
prise of union-building. Good luck to them, Americans may say. Let them
sort out their Balkan backyard.
1 5
Ignatius has cautioned that if the increasingly differential interests and
capabilities between the United States and Europe remain unresolved,
"both sides will soon find themselves on very unstable ground."'16 This
would be an unfortunate, if not fatal, result, not just for the United States
and Europe, but for freedom around the world. For at a time when ter-
rorists and their state sponsors seek to obtain or develop weapons of mass
destruction, 17 the United States and Europe need each other. The Econo-
mist, for example, observed the following:
12. Aaron, supra note 10.
13. Clark et al., supra note 9.
14. Ignatius, supra note 3.
15. See Mr. Bush Goes to Europe, supra note 8.
16. Ignatius, supra note 3.
17. In his January 29, 2002 State of the Union address, President George W. Bush
decried the existence of an "axis of evil," consisting of states determined to undermine
world peace. More specifically, the President named North Korea, Iran, and Iraq as con-
stituent members of this axis, declaring:
States like these and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to
threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these
regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to
terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our
allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price
of indifference would be catastrophic.
We will work closely with our coalition to deny terrorists and their state spon-
sors the materials, technology, and expertise to make and deliver weapons of
mass destruction. We will develop and deploy effective missile defenses to pro-
tect America and our allies from sudden attack. And all nations should know:
America will do what is necessary to ensure our nation's security.
President George W. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of
the Union, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 133 (Jan. 29, 2002), available at 2002 WL
111830.
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[The United States and Europe] are, together, not only the main engine of
the world's economy but the main custodian of its liberal values. They have
strong interests in common, and each has additional interests in persuading
the other to be at least partly involved in less obvious areas of concern:
America needs European help in Asia, Europe needs American help almost
everywhere. Why? Because neither power, not even the United States, is
usually strong enough, on its own, to carry the day. Moreover, experience-
remember Bosnia-shows that one without the other makes little headway,
whereas the two together can be effective. 18
Some commentators note, however, "[siolutions exist, or can be found,
for all the problems that beset the allies, so long as they are prepared to
work to settle their differences."'19 This is why proponents of strengthened
relations between the United States and European Union welcomed their
joint press release of April 11, 2001, announcing the resolution of their so-
called "banana dispute. ' 20 A trade disagreement like the one over bananas
may be but symptomatic of the larger challenges faced by the alliance.
Even within the limited context of trade, the banana dispute pales in com-
parison with what is at stake in other trade matters such as the "nuclear
bomb" of FSC sanctions. Nevertheless, the two sides' willingness to negoti-
ate a deal over bananas shows that their disagreements over trade need not
always end badly. To that extent, at least, the banana dispute settlement
represents a small but good and significant exception to the overall decline
in American-European relations.
The first part of this essay explores the background and history of the
banana dispute, and the terms of its settlement. The second part addresses
the implications of the settlement for the poorer exporting nations that it
affects most directly. Lastly, I will analyze one aspect of trade policy about
which the United States and European Union appear to be in agreement-
namely, the desirability of tying aid and preferential trade arrangements to
progress toward effective governance in beneficiary developing countries.
I. The Background and History of the Banana Dispute
The origins of the banana dispute can be traced to the late 1950s when
the European Community (EC) first established preferential trading
arrangements with former European colonies in Africa and the Caribbean
and Pacific regions (ACPs). 2t These preferential arrangements included
18. Mr. Bush goes to Europe, supra note 8.
19. Id.; see also Ignatius, supra note 3 (concluding that both Europe and the United
States need to understand the anxieties of the other in order to preserve their declining
relationship).
20. See Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, Joint United
States-European Union Release: U.S. Government and European Commission Reach
Agreement to Resolve Long-Standing Banana Dispute (Apr. 11, 2001), available at http:/
/www.ustr.gov/2001/04/01-23.html.
21. See Mauricio Salas & John H. Jackson, Procedural Overview of the WTO EC-
Banana Dispute, 3J. INT'L ECON. L. 145, 146-47 (2000). For a detailed historical discus-
sion of the evolution and implementation of the EU's banana import regime, see Rikke
Thagesen & Alan Matthews, The EU's Common Banana Regime: An Initial Evaluation, 35
J. COMMON MKT. STUDIEs 615 (1997).
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the duty-free importation of ACP bananas into Europe. 22 The duty-free
treatment was designed to make ACP bananas competitive with imports
from Latin America, where heavy capital investment by American multina-
tional fruit conglomerates like Dole and Chiquita Brands had substantially
reduced the fruit's production costs. 23 As a result of successive trade agree-
ments with the ACP, "most European national systems had quantitative
restrictions or licensing requirements affecting the banana trade, especially
that stemming from non-ACP exporters." 24 Because American corpora-
tions held a high stake in Latin American fruit production, U.S. economic
interests were affected by these European-ACP trade arrangements despite
the fact that only a small amount of the world's total production of bananas
actually occurs within U.S. borders.
2 5
A. Bananas I
The Latin American countries were first to use the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) dispute settlement process to challenge
Europe's banana import regime. In 1993, Costa Rica, Colombia, Nicara-
gua, Guatemala, and Venezuela invoked GATT dispute settlement proce-
dures to allege that European banana import quota and licensing schemes
violated global trading rules. 26 Later that year, a panel established by the
GATT Council sided with the Latin Americans, finding that the European
quota regimes violated Articles I and XI.1 of GATT. 27 The former provi-
sion requires GATT members to extend to each other most-favored-nation
(MFN) treatment; the latter bars the enactment of quantitative import
restrictions at the national level. 28 However, implementation of the panel's
ruling-known as "Bananas I"-was blocked by the EEC and ACP countries
and never formally effectuated. 29 Under GATT dispute settlement rules in
place at the time, panel reports took effect only if approved by consensus of
the GATT Council. 30 Hence any GATT member could "block" the imple-
mentation of a panel report.
3 1
22. See Daniel Marinberg, GATT/WTO Waivers: "Exceptional Circumstances" as
Applied to the Lome Waiver, 19 B.U. INT'L L.J. 129, 153 (2001); Salas & Jackson, supra
note 21, at 146.
23. See Salas & Jackson, supra note 21, at 146-47.
24. Id. at 146.
25. See id. at 146-47.
26. See GATT Dispute Panel Report on EEC-Member States' Import Regime for
Bananas, DS32/R (June 3, 1993), 1993 WL 840284 (unpublished Panel Report).
27. See id.
28. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT], art. 1:1 (requiring a member state to
accord any product originating in or destined for another member state the same advan-
tages, privileges, favors, or immunities that the member state grants to any other GATT
country); GATT art. XI.1 (prohibiting quantitative restrictions, or quotas, on imports
from GATT member states).
29. See Salas & Jackson, supra note 21, at 148.
30. See id. at 148, n. 18.
31. See id. This regulation allowed even unsuccessful parties to block implementa-
tion. Id.
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B. Bananas 11
Shortly thereafter, the Council of the European Union changed
Europe's banana import regime by adopting Regulation 404/93, effective
July 1, 1993.32 The regulation purported to complete the Europeans' inter-
nal market pursuant to the Single European Act of 1996 by harmonizing,
or making uniform, the treatment of banana imports across the European
Community, establishing a set of common rules to replace various national
import schemes. 33 The new regulation also came under attack by the
Latin Americans. 34 Like its predecessor regime, Regulation 404/93 main-
tained the distinctions between ACP and non-ACP exporters in a way that
favored the ACP exporters. As one legal analyst explained the situation,
"[Tihe allocation of the tariff quotas, as well as a system of import licenses
foreseen in Regulation 404/93 benefited ACP countries, to the detriment of
non-ACP exporters, imposing new restrictions on the import of bananas
into EU Members States, including Germany. '3 5 The inclusion of Ger-
many was significant because it had traditionally been the largest European
consumer of bananas and, prior to the adoption of Regulation 404/93, Ger-
many had always gone it alone in insisting upon the right to import duty-
free, non-ACP bananas.
36
For the second time, in what became known as "Bananas II," a panel
appointed by the GATT Council to hear the Latin Americans' complaint
ruled against the Europeans. Regulation 404/93 was found to violate
GATT Article I, which embodies the most-favored-nation principle; Article
II concerning tariff bindings; and Article III's national treatment obliga-
tion.3 7 However, the EU again blocked implementation of the Bananas II
panel report.
38
The EU and ACP states subsequently tried a different approach. In
late 1994, they formally sought, and were in fact granted, a waiver of their
GATT obligations pursuant to GATT Article XXV:5 and WTO Article
IX:3. 39 Under those provisions, the GATT General Council and the WTO
Ministerial Conference may waive GATT members' obligations under the
GATT and related multilateral trade agreements in exceptional circum-
stances.40  More specifically, the Europeans and ACP countries were
granted the so-called "Lom Waiver" in relation to the Lom IV Convention
that was the basis for their trade and development relationship. 4 1 The
32. Council Regulation 404/93, art. 12, 1993 Oj. (L 47); see Salas & Jackson, supra
note 21, at 148.
33. See Council Regulation 404/93, art. 12, 1993 OJ. (L 47); Salas &Jackson, supra
note 21, at 146-47.
34. See GATT Panel Report, EEC-Import Regime for Bananas, DS38/R (Feb. 11,
1.994), 1994 WL 910939.
35. Salas &Jackson, supra note 21, at 147.
36. See id. at 146-47.
37. See EEC-Import Regime for Bananas, supra note 34.
38. See Salas & Jackson, supra note 21, at 148.
39. Marinberg, supra note 22, at 130.
40. id.
41. Salas & Jackson, supra note 21, at 149; Marinberg, supra note 22, at 153-59.
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Lom IV Convention extended ACP exporters access to the European mar-
ket on preferential terms, "given the extreme importance of the trade provi-
sions of the Fourth Lomb Convention for the economy of the ACP
countries.
42
When EU and ACP representatives requested an extension of the
waiver in 1996, they explained, "The circumstances justifying the waiver,
in particular the trade, financial and development needs of the beneficiary
States, continue to exist. While the Lom IV Convention has promoted the
economic growth of the ACP States, their development has not yet reached
a level that would permit a termination of preferential treatment. '4 3 The
requested extension was granted with vague reference to "exceptional cir-
cumstances" that continued to justify it.
44
In the meantime, the Europeans pursued a negotiated settlement of the
dispute. On March 29, 1994, Colombia, Costa Rica, Venezuela, and Nica-
ragua accepted the so-called Framework Agreement on Bananas. 4 5 By the
terms of the Framework Agreement, the EU pledged to increase the tariff
quota for non-ACP bananas on a country-by-country basis, and to revise
the management of export licenses.46 In exchange, the Latin American
countries agreed to forego further action against the Europeans under
GATT. Ultimately, however, the framework was not accepted by all par-
ties.4 7 Guatemala refused to accept it,48 and Germany and the United
States protested.49 Ecuador, the world's leading banana producer, and Pan-
ama were not members of the GATT at the time the framework was con-
cluded, and thus were not eligible to participate in it.
50
C. Bananas III
In 1995, after the Uruguay Round agreements took effect, providing
aggrieved GATT members access to the new WTO dispute settlement pro-
cess, the United States joined Latin American states that had not agreed to
the Framework Agreement on Bananas in a third challenge-known as
"Bananas llI"-to the EU's banana import regime. 5 1 The WTO dispute set-
tlement process had put "automaticity" in place, a reverse consensus sys-
tem under which panel rulings would take effect automatically unless
rejected by a consensus of WTO members. 52 Hence "blocking" was effec-
42. Marinberg, supra note 22, at 156 (citing ACP Countries-European Communities
Fourth Lom Convention: Request for Waiver, GATT Doc. L/7539 (Oct. 10, 1994)).
43. Id. at 157 (citing The Fourth ACP-EC Convention of Lom6: Request for an
Extension of a Waiver, WTO Doc. G/L/108 (Sept. 9, 1996)).
44. See id.
45. See Salas & Jackson, supra note 21, at 149-50.
46. See id. at 149.
47. Id.
48. See id. at 150.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 150-51.
51. See WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Regime for the
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, Complaint by the United States, WT/
DS27/R/USA (May 22, 1997), available at 1997 WL 461900, 1997 WTO DS LEXIS 13.
52. Salas &Jackson, supra note 21, at 150-51.
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tively prevented because no single state, or bloc of states, could keep a
panel report from being implemented. If a WTO panel ruled against the
EU's banana import regime, as GATT panels had done twice before, non-
ACP banana producers would be entitled to levy retaliatory sanctions on
European imported goods.
5 3
On May 22, 1997, the Bananas III panel circulated reports in each
complainant's case, and Europe was again found in violation of global trad-
ing rules.54 Among other things, the panel found that the EU banana
import scheme was inconsistent with GATT Articles 1:1, 111:4, X:3, and
XIII: 1, as well as Article 1.3 of the Licensing Agreement, and Articles II and
XVII of General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). 5 5 The panel fur-
ther limited the scope of the Lom Waiver to violations of Article I of
GATT, which embodies the most-favored-nation principle.5 6 The Lom
Waiver was declared void to the extent that it permitted violation of GATT
Article XIII, which requires that GATT members administer permissible
quota schemes in a non-discriminatory way.5 7 The panel report was
upheld, with some modification, by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body
("DSB"), 58 and adopted by reverse consensus on September 25, 1997.5
9
Over the course of the following year, the parties failed to reach agree-
ment on a time frame for implementing the Bananas III panel ruling. Frus-
trated by the "tactics displayed by the EU,"60 the United States gave notice
on October 22, 1998 that it would act unilaterally to impose retaliatory
sanctions against an array of European imports under Section 301 of the
Trade Act of 1974.61 At the WTO, the American action was followed by
what one scholarly analysis has referred to as an "inventory" of at least
53. For a discussion of how the WTO dispute settlement system operates, see JOHN
H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAl PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASES, MATER-
IALS AND THE TEXT ON THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF TRANSNATIONAL
ECONOMIC RELATIONS 269-71 (4th ed. 2002).
54. Salas &Jackson, supra note 21, at 151.
55. Id. This particular violation was found in the case of the United States. Id.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Regime for the
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9, 1997), availa-
ble at 1997 WL 577784, 1997 WTO DS LEXIS 10.
59. See Salas & Jackson, supra note 21, at 152.
60. Id. at 155.
61. Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975) (section 301 was codifed as amended
at 19 U.S.C. § 2411, the remaining sections were codifed as amended at 19 U.S.C.
§§ 2101, 2102, 2111-2114, 2114a, 2115-2119, 2131-2137, 2151-2155, 2171,
2191-2194, 2211-2213, 2231, 2232, 2241, 2242, 2251-2254, 2271-2275, 2291-2298,
2311-2321, 2341-2352, 2354, 2355, 2371-2374, 2391-2395, 2401, 2401a-2401g,
2412-2420, 2431-2439, 2451, 2451a, 2451b, 2461-2466, 2466a, 2466b, 2467,
2481-2486, 2491-2495); see also Implementation of WTO Recommendations Concern-
ing the European Communities' Regime for the Importation, Sale, and Distribution of
Bananas, 63 Fed. Reg. 56,687-01 (Oct. 22, 1998). For a discussion of Section 301, see
MICHAEL K. YOUNG, UNITED STATES TRADE LAW AND POLICY 85-114 (2001). Essentially,
Section 301 allows the United States to use "economic leverage to encourage foreign
countries to open their markets to U.S. goods and protect U.S. assets and investments."
Id. at 85.
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"seven 'separate' proceedings or 'cases' causing considerable confusion in
the press and the public."
6 2
On April 19, 1999 the Office of the United States Trade Representative
announced that the WTO authorized the United States to suspend GATT
concessions to the European Union based on its failure to conform its
banana import regime to the Bananas III panel ruling.63 By that time, how-
ever, the United States had already acted. On April 9, 1999, the U.S. Trade
Representative had published a list of retaliatory tariffs totaling some
$191.4 million annually. 64 The targeted European imports included a
diverse array of items, from bath preparations, handbags, and uncoated felt
paper to bed linens, lead-acid storage batteries, and electrothermic coffee
or tea makers.
65
D. The Banana Dispute Settlement
Two years later, those sanctions were still in effect when, on April 11,
2001, the United States and European Union issued a joint press release
announcing that they had reached a negotiated settlement of their banana
dispute.66 Roughly two weeks later, on April 30, 2001, the EU announced
that its understanding with the United States had served as the basis for
ending the EU's banana dispute with Ecuador as well.67 On May 2, 2001,
62. Salas & Jackson, supra note 21, at 162.
63. See Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, WTO Autho-
rizes U.S. Retaliation (Apr. 19, 1999), available at http://www.ustr.gov/releases/1999/
04/99-38.pdf; Salas & Jackson, supra note 21, at 161.
64. See Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, USTR
Announces Final Product List in Bananas Dispute (Apr. 9, 1999), available at http://
www.ustr.gov/releases/1999/04/99-35.pdf; Salas & Jackson, supra note 21, at 161.
65. See USTR Announces Final Product List in Bananas Dispute, supra note 64.
66. See Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, U.S. Govern-
ment and European Commission Reach Agreement to Resolve Long-Standing Banana
Dispute (Apr. 11, 2001), available at http://www.ustr.gov/releases/2001/04/01-
23.html. As reported in the joint press release, the gist of the agreement reached by the
parties is as follows:
The new [EU banana import] system is scheduled to take effect on July 1, 2001.
The European Union will institute a system of licensing, based on historic refer-
ence periods from July 1, 2001. The European Commission will also initiate the
necessary procedures to propose to the Council of Ministers an adjustment of
the quantities in the various quotas, in order to expand access for Latin Ameri-
can bananas and to secure a marketshare for a specific quantity of bananas of
ACP origin. The United States has pledged to work actively to secure acceptance
of the EU's request for the necessary WTO authorization. Once these steps have
been completed, the sanctions will be. definitively lifted.
A tariff-only system is scheduled to take effect on January 1, 2006. The Euro-
pean Union will begin negotiations necessary under WTO rules in time to intro-
duce the tariff-only system from January 1, 2006.
The European Commission will now table the necessary proposals to the Coun-
cil of Ministers and the European Parliament in order to fully implement the
agreement as soon as possible.
Id.
67. See Press Release, EU and Ecuador Reach Agreement to Resolve WTO Banana Dis-
pute, (Apr. 30, 2001), at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/trade/miti/dispute/bana ecu.
htm. The agreement provides, inter alia, that:
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the European Commission adopted a regulation designed to implement the
understanding reached by the EU with the United States and Ecuador,
respectively. 68 The regulation's adoption prompted the United States to
suspend, on July 2, 2001, the $191.4 million in increased customs duties
that it had imposed on European imports back in April 1999.69 The for-
mal end to the long-running banana dispute came on December 19, 2001
when the Council of the European Union, more commonly known as the
Council of Ministers, adopted regulations that put the EU's new banana
import regime in place. 70
In accordance with the understandings reached with the United States
and Ecuador, the Europeans will establish a tariff-only system for banana
imports by January 1, 2006.71 In the meantime, pursuant to European
Commission regulation 896/01,72 the EU will be allowed to maintain a
modified system of tariff quotas, allotting import licenses on the basis of
historical preferences based on trade between the years 1994 and 1996. 73
This should soften the impact that increased competition will have on the
economies of the ACP states. According to a Dow Jones & Company
assessment,
The new [EU banana import] rules will grant traditional suppliers of
bananas to the E.U. access to 83% of the total import quota of 2.4 million
tons, while nontraditional suppliers, like Ecuador, will have the remaining
The new [EU banana import] regime will provide increased opportunities for
Ecuadorian exports. It abolishes the EU's import break down on a country
quota basis, increases the import volumes from Latin America by 100,000 ton-
nes, and improves market access to traditional and non traditional importers
from Ecuador, following the WTO ruling on GATS. The new regime will hold
for a transitional period through to the establishment of a tariff-only system by
2006.
Id. The Understanding between the EU and Ecuador is fully compatible with the one
reached between the EU and US earlier this month. Id.
68. See Press Release, WTO Dispute Settlement: Bananas, Commission Adopts Regu-
lation to End Banana Dispute (May 2, 2001), at http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/miti/
dispute/banaregul.htm [hereinafter Commission Adopts Regulation].
69. See Press Release, WTO Dispute Settlement: Bananas, Commission Welcomes
Decision on Final Step to Settle Banana Dispute (Dec. 19, 2001), at http://europa.eu.int/
comm/trade/miti/dispute/bana20011219.htm.
70. See id., Victoria Knight, EU Adopts New Banana Import Rulers [sic], Resolves Row
With US, Dow JONES INT'L NEWS, Dec. 19, 2001, available at WESTLAW,
ALLNEWSPLUS.
71. See U.S. Government and European Commission Reach Agreement to Resolve
Long-Standing Banana Dispute, supra note 66; EU and Ecuador Reach Agreement to
Resolve WTO Banana Dispute, supra note 67; Commission Adopts Regulation, supra
note 68; WTO Dispute Settlement: Bananas, Commission Welcomes Decision on Final
Step to Settle Banana Dispute, supra note 69; Knight, supra note 70.
72. See WTO Dispute Settlement: Bananas, Commission Welcomes Decision on
Final Step to Settle Banana Dispute, supra note 69.
73. See Knight, supra note 70. The WTO Ministerial Conference waived the GATT
obligations of the EC, which the EC needed to implement the new EU banana import
regime's tariff quotas during the transitional period to a tariff-only system, on November
14, 2001. See European Communities - Transitional Regime for the EC Autonomous
Tariff Rate Quotas on Imports of Bananas, WT/MIN(01)/16 (Nov. 14, 2001), available
at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/docse.htm.
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1 7%. Other technical provisions on areas such as compensatory aid and the
financing of producer organizations have also been included so that the sys-
tem fully complies with World Trade Organization rules.
74
By Dow Jones' estimate, the interim arrangement will increase Euro-
pean import volumes from Latin America from 100,000 to 353,000 tons
annually.
75
II. Good for American Corporations, Latin American Producers, and
European Consumers, but bad for the ACP?
A. Ending the ACP's Preferential Trade Status
Europe has long insisted that without preferential treatment in the
form of tariff quotas and other financial assistance, the relatively ineffi-
cient "small-scale banana growers in [the] 'Lome Convention' countries"
would never be able to compete effectively with the behemoth American
corporate banana producers based in Latin America. 76 The ACP is com-
prised of 78 nations, 77 fifty-six of which are members of the WTO. 78 The
"twelve traditional banana producing ACP countries" are Cameroon, Cape
Verde, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Somalia, Jamaica, Belize, St. Lucia, St. Vin-
cent, Grenada, Dominica, and Suriname. 79 Of these twelve, Madagascar
and Somalia are considered ACP least-developed states.80 Several years
ago, when Jamaican Prime Minister Percival Patterson observed, "Bananas
are to us what cars are to Detroit," he stated the obvious about the extent to
which ACP banana producers depend on access to the European market for
their subsistence. 8 1 That is why the European Union, through the "supply
restricting provisions" of its banana import regime, has limited Latin Amer-
ican, or "dollar" bananas, access to the European market, in effect subsi-
dizing ACP growers by making EU consumers pay roughly twice as much
for bananas as their American and Eastern European counterparts.
8 2
74. See Knight, supra note 70. As used in the quoted passage, the term "compensa-
tory aid" refers to annual financial assistance provided by the EU to banana producers.
This compensation "is designed to offset the loss of income resulting from the common
trade regime and the removal of the protection these producers enjoyed under their for-
mer national regimes." Thagesen & Matthews, supra note 21, at 616.
75. See Knight, supra note 70.
76. EU/US/Ecuador: EU Formally Changes Banana Rules, EUR. REP., Dec. 22, 2001,
available at 2001 WL 31786254.
77. See EU Official Outlines New Export Conditions for ACP Countries, EFE NEws
SERV., Feb. 15, 2002, available at WESTLAW, ALLNEWSPLUS.
78. See Greta Hopkins, Trade: ACP Ministers to Present United Front at Doha, INTER
PRESS SERV., Nov. 8, 2001, available at 2001 WL 4805908.
79. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament - Special
Framework of Assistance for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas (Council Regulation
856/1999) - Biennial Report from the Commission 2000, available at http://www.
europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/rpt/2001/com200l_0067en01.pdf [hereinafter Biennial
Report of the Commission 20001.
80. See The Cotonou Agreement: ACP Least-Developed States and Landlocked States, at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/cotonou/landlocked-en.htm.
81. WARREN J. KEEGAN & MARK C. GREEN, GLOBAL MARKETING 125 (2d ed. 2000).
82. See Biennial Report from the Commission 2000, supra note 79, at 3. The Bien-
nial Report provides a good discussion of the world banana market:
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As the twentieth century drew to a close, ACP leaders came to the reali-
zation that the preferential treatment accorded them would eventually give
way. Thus, regarding bananas, they focused their diplomacy not so much
on resisting the inevitable as on buying time and obtaining the financial
and technical assistance required to make their banana producers more
competitive, or to diversify their fruit production. When it became clear
that the Europeans intended to provide them with a transitional period
before implementing a new tariff-only banana import regime, some ACP
leaders expressed guarded relief. As the Prime Minister of Grenada stated
in 1998,
We thought we would have been cut off from our market right away, so this
is a hopeful sign for us. But the message is clear-we cannot sit and wait
because the preferences we have now will not be there for long. We now
have some time, but we must recognize the reality of the situation and deal
with it.
8 3
The ACP states have pursued essentially the same strategy in regard to
the other trade preferences traditionally accorded them under the terms of
the Lom Convention, which expired in 2000 and has now been replaced
by the Cotonou Agreement 8 4 as the basis for trade relations between the
European Union and the ACP. For example, going into November 2001
trade negotiations with their European counterparts, ACP representatives
sought an extension of the Cotonou trade preferences through the year
2008.85 As discussed, the interim period during which quota tariffs will
be permitted under the banana dispute settlement will end when a tariff-
only system begins on January 1, 2006.
Some analysts questioned the extent to which the ACP states benefited
from trade preferences like those accorded under the old banana import
regime. The preferential trade provisions of the erstwhile Lom Conven-
tion have been criticized as "not [being] sufficiently large to promote
export growth and export diversification among the ACPs. ''86 For example,
The world banana market is dominated on the consumption side by the US and
EU markets each of which consume between 3.5 mn and 4.0 mn tons of
bananas a year. The USA imports practically all its bananas, while the EU
imports about 80 per cent (the remaining twenty per cent coming from [Euro-
pean] Community producers). On the production side, producers in Latin
America supply all the US market and about 80 per cent of EU imports, leaving
some 20 per cent of imports for ACP producers ....
... These figures give some idea of the gaps in competitivity between the Latin
American suppliers and the ACP suppliers ....
Id.
83. See KEEGAN & GREEN, supra note 81, at 125.
84. Partnership Agreement between the Members of the African, Caribbean and
Pacific Group of States of the one part, and the European Community and its Member
States, of the other part, June 23, 2000, 2000 OJ. (L 317) 3.
85. See Hopkins, supra note 78.
86. See Lars Nilsson, Trading Relations: Is the Roadmap from Lome to Cotonou Cor-
rect?, APPLIED ECON., Mar. 10, 2002, available at 2002 WL 13808704. In fact, under the
Lom6 regime, ACPs failed to maintain or increase their EU market shares, but countries
not receiving preferences increased theirs. See id. Nilsson concluded, however, that dur-
ing the study period 1973 to 1992, ACP exporters at least fared better under the Lom
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in their 1997 assessment of the of the European banana import regime,
Rikke Thagesen and Alan Matthews observed:
The unified trade regime aimed at preserving the pre-SEM [Single European
Market] situation with its protection of imports from preferred suppliers
despite their lack of competitiveness. However, the ACPs have not been able
to fulfil their import quotas and have experienced an overall welfare loss.
Nor have the EU producers supplied their full quota eligible for compensa-
tion but, because they are entitled to a high target price and compensation
payment, it is unlikely that they have experienced critical welfare changes.
87
Moreover, "[T]he EU consumers pay banana prices much higher [than] the
world price and thereby bear the cost of the preferential trade system."'8 8
For these reasons, Thagesen and Matthews predicted that the EU
would stop favoring ACPs in the future, but needed to gradually phase out
preferential treatment to avoid adversely impacting ACPs' economies.8 9
The authors suggested that the Europeans develop a new banana import
regime that would include-at least during a transitional period-direct
payments to preferred suppliers for social support and crop diversification,
instead of, in effect, requiring EU banana consumers to subsidize the ACP
banana growers. 90 What the European Union has done under its Special
Framework for Assistance for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas, or
"SFA" program, is to provide ACP beneficiary countries access to financial
and technical assistance in order "to improve competitiveness in the
banana sector or to support diversification where improvement in the com-
petitiveness of the banana sector is not sustainable."9 1
In reality, diversification may be the most advisable course for ACP
growers to follow, given the recent decrease in banana prices and the bleak
outlook as to banana prices in the future.9 2 Diversification may, at any
rate, be the only practical solution since, by one estimation, the only ACP
countries with a realistic chance of competing effectively against Costa
Rica or Ecuador in the production of bananas are Cameroon and Ivory
Coast.9 3 However, recognizing global realities may be easier than respond-
ing to them. As one official in St. Lucia warned several years ago, "Genera-
tions of farmers and entire families in these islands have been weaned on
bananas and they know nothing else. They do not and could not under-
stand how to produce anything else. And we would not know where to
start with marketing anything else."
94
regime than they did under the General System of Preferences (GSP) for developing
countries that was implemented by GATT waiver adopted by the GATT member states in
1971. See id. For a discussion of the GSP, seeJACKSON ET AL., supra note 53, at 1186-94.
87. Thagesen & Matthews, supra note 21, at 625.
88. Id. at 625-26.
89. See id. at 626.
90. See id.
91. Biennial Report of the Commission 2000, supra note 79, at 5.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. KEEGAN & GREEN, supra note 81, at 125.
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B. One Thing About Which the United States and European Union
Agree: Linking Aid to Reform
The dilemma that the banana dispute settlement poses for Europeans
in regard to their traditional ACP banana suppliers is but a microcosm of
the overall challenge faced by the wealthy nations in regard to the develop-
ing world-namely, how best to promote poor countries' economic devel-
opment. The United States and European Union have their differences, but
one thing about which they agree is that the economic development poli-
cies and practices of the past have generally failed. In the United States,
declining domestic political support for foreign aid has prompted a grow-
ing "trade, not aid" sentiment, 95 which attempts to link increased Ameri-
can trade and overseas investment to political and social reform in
beneficiary developing nations.
96
For example, the U.S. Trade and Development Act of 200097 asks Sub-
Saharan African nations to "commit to the rule of law, economic reform,
and the eradication of poverty"; strengthen and expand the private sector,
"especially enterprises owned by women and small businesses"; and facili-
tate the "development of c ivil societies and political freedom. '98 What the
legislation reflects is the growing American attitude that while historical
factors like colonialism and white racism play an ongoing role in the devel-
oping world's poverty, so do other elements of poorer nations' own mak-
ing, including despotism, lack of political accountability, and
corruption.
9 9
The European Union's policy toward the developing world reflects
similar, if not identical, sentiments. European officials have expressed
their desire for a "more adult relationship" with the ACP in the post-Lom
world, meaning "more mutual trade and less economic dependency."'10 0
Toward that end, the European Union has declared its goal of making "aid
and preferential trade arrangements with the ACP states dependent on
their democratization, including equality for women and improved finan-
cial management within the ACP countries." 10 1 As former EU Develop-
ment Commissioner Joao de Deus Pinheiro once said, "where countries
produce good [democratic] results, they will be better supported" by the
European Union. 102
95. For a discussion of "trade, not aid" sentiment in the context of United States
trade policy toward Africa, see Hunter R. Clark, African "Renaissance" and U.S. Trade
Policy, 27 GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 265, 273-74 (1999).
96. See id.
97. Pub. L. No. 106-200, 114 Stat. 251 (2000) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.
§§ 2466a, 2466b, 3701-06, 3721-24, 3731-41 (2002)).
98. Id. at §103(5)-(7) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 3702(5)-(7) (2002)).
99. For a discussion of the factors that contribute to wealth disparity, see Nancy
Birdsall, Life is Unfair: Inequality in the World, 111 FOREIGN POL'Y 76, 80 (1998). See also
Clark, supra note 95, at 299-301 (discussing the "toad king" generation of dictatorial
African leaders who left their countries even worse off than they found them).
100. Clark, supra note 95, at 275 (quoting former EU Development Commissioner
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At the United Nations Financing for Development Conference, held in
March 2002 in Monterrey, Mexico, President George W. Bush called for a
"new compact for development defined by greater accountability for rich
and poor nations, alike."' 1 3 Alluding to the policy failures of the past, he
declared:
For decades, the success of development aid was measured only in the
resources spent, not the results achieved. Yet, pouring money into a failed
status quo does little to help the poor, and can actually delay the progress of
reform. We must accept a higher, more difficult, more promising call.
Developed nations have a duty not only to share our wealth, but also to
encourage sources that produce wealth: economic freedom, political liberty,
the rule of law and human rights.
The lesson of our time is clear: When nations close their markets and oppor-
tunity is hoarded by a privileged few, no amount-no amount-of develop-
ment aid is ever enough. When nations respect their people, open markets,
invest in better health and education, every dollar of aid, every dollar of
trade revenue and domestic capital is used more effectively. We must tie
greater aid to political and legal and economic reforms.
10 4
The President went on to promise that the United States will increase its
"core development assistance" to the developing world by fifty percent over
the next three years, a "$5 billion annual increase over current levels."'
10 5
Countries that qualify for access to this assistance will be selected on the
basis of criteria to be developed by U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell and
U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Paul O'Neill.
10 6
The European Union, for its part, has pledged to increase funding for
trade related technical assistance (TRTA) thereby sending what EU Trade
Commissioner Pascal Lamy has called "a clear signal of [the EU's] strong
commitment to help developing countries integrate in and benefit from
multilateral trade .... 107 Lamy declared, "We are making huge progress
towards trade and globalisation in support of development and poverty
eradication."' 1 8 Whether the developing nations have the will and capac-
ity to rise to the challenges posed by their American and European benefac-
tors remains to be seen.
Conclusion
The United States and European Union seem to agree about little these
days. This is a dangerous state of affairs, coming as it does at a time when
the free world needs the United States and Europe to stand together against
terrorists and their state sponsors who seek to acquire weapons of mass
103. President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President at the United Nations
Financing for Development Conference in Monterrey, Mexico, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 483 (Mar. 22, 2002), available at 2002 WL 442050.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See id. at 483-84.
107. EU Welcomes Increased Trade Related Technical Assistance, REUTERS ENG. NEWS
SERV., Mar. 13, 2002, available at WESTLAW, ALLNEWSPLUS.
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destruction. That is why proponents of strengthened ties between the
United State and Europe are heartened by the fact that the two sides have
reached a settlement of their long-standing WTO banana dispute. A trade
disagreement like the one over bananas may be but symptomatic of the
larger internal challenges faced by the Atlantic alliance. Even within the
limited context of trade, the banana dispute pales in comparison with what
is at stake in other trade matters. For example, U.S. trade representative
Robert Zoellick has warned that the $4 billion in sanctions that loom in the
controversy over FSCs would go off like a "nuclear bomb" in world trade
relations. 109 Nevertheless, the two sides' willingness to negotiate a deal
over bananas shows that their disagreements over trade need not always
end badly. To that extent, at least, the banana dispute settlement repre-
sents a small but good and significant exception to the overall decline in
American-European relations.
By the terms of the banana settlement, bananas produced by non-ACP
growers will enjoy, during a transitional period, substantially increased
access to the European market. Then, on January 1, 2006, the European
Union will implement a "tariff-only" banana import regime, completely
eliminating the tariff quotas that have traditionally been used to favor
banana growers from the ACP states that are former European colonies.
The result should benefit banana producers in Latin America, where U.S.
multinational fruit conglomerates like Dole and Chiquita have made heavy
investments of capital. Importing more fruit from Latin America should
also result in lower prices for European consumers. However, increased
competition from Latin America may cause hardship in the developing
ACP countries where banana exports to Europe are economically vital.
ACP countries now face the daunting challenge of making their banana
producers more competitive, or diversifying their fruit production.
The banana dispute settlement poses a dilemma for Europeans in
regard to their traditional ACP banana suppliers, a dilemma that is but a
microcosm of the overall challenge faced by the wealthy nations in regard
to the developing world-how best to promote economic development in
poor countries. For the time being, at least, the United States and the Euro-
pean Union remain committed to providing-in fact, to increasing-devel-
opment assistance to the developing countries of the ACP and elsewhere.
One thing about which the United States and the European Union agree is
that future aid should be tied to democratization and reform in the devel-
oping nations. Neither the U.S. nor Europe is willing to repeat the unsuc-
cessful policies and practices of the past by providing aid that fails to
produce the desired beneficial results. Whether the developing countries
have the will and capacity to rise to the challenge of reform is an open
question.
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